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COURT OF APPEALS, 1958 TERM
Relying upon In re Coddington's Will6 the Court said that even if the
statements were hearsay they were still admissible under Section 374-a of the
Civil Practice Act. In In re Coddington's Will the Court decided that certain
hospital records were admissible under Section 374-a since the purpose of this
4
section is to overcome the objection of the hearsay ruler.
The objection to admitting such records into evidence, and also the
primary reason behind the hearsay rule, is that such admissions deny the
other party an opportunity to cross-examine the entrant of such records.
The Court met this objection by relying upon Johnson v. Lutz,65 which disposed
of this objection, but at the same time limited Section 374-a to instances where
The
the entrant has the duty of drawing such memoranda or records.
Court then pointed out in the instant case that the Department of Welfare was
required by law to keep records of all telephone calls and visits connected with
0 7
their beneficiaries.
The decision in this case indicates that the Court is willing to lessen
the strictness of the hearsay rule by giving Section 374-a a broad construction.
This means that there will be a greater infringement upon the right of crossexamination. However, with the complexity of our modern business world
it seems more practical and just to admit such records into evidence where the
genuineness of the records is not disputed. The hearsay rule was workable
a century ago but to require the complex business world of today to abide
by it would result in great hardships and oftentimes exclude the best evidence
available.
THIRD PARTY PRACTIcE-AcTIVE AND PAssIVE NEGLIGENCE

The right of a defendant to implead another depends upon his being able
to demonstrate a right to be indemnified by the one he seeks to implead.6 8
Where a defendant is alleged to be only liable for active as distinguished from
passive negligence, impleader is improper as a matter of law, since an actively
ments made out of court, this statement must be limited to the case of a witness who is
not the adverse party."
63. 307 N.Y. 181, 120 N.E.2d 777 (1954).
64. 307 N.Y. 181, 195: "Section 374-a of the C.PA., providing for the admission
into evidence of records made in the regular course of business, was enacted to overcome
the objection that such records were hearsay."
65. Supra note 57.
66. 253 N.Y. 124 at 128:
The purpose of the Legislature in enacting Section 374-a was to permit a
writing or record, made in the regular course of business, to be received
in evidence without the necessity of calling as witnesses all of the persons
who had any part in making it, provided the record was made as a part
of the duty of the person making it, or on information imparted by
persons who were under a duty to impart such information.
67. N.Y. Soc. WmL. LAW §§ 80, 132; Regulations of N.Y. State Dep't of Soc. Wel.
§ 1.36(9).
68. "Indemnity refers to a total shifting of economic loss to the party chiefly or
primarily responsible for that loss; it is to be distinguished from contribution which means
a percentage distribution of the loss among a number of responsible parties." Meriam &
Thornton "Indemnity Between Tort-Jeasors; An Evolving Doctrine in the New York
Court of Appeals." 25 N.Y.U. LAW REv. 845 (1950).
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negligent tort-feasor is not entitled to indemnity. 69 If a complaint can be interpreted as including an allegation of passive negligence on the part of the defendant, a claim over against a third party charging him with active negligence
will be allowed--but if only active negligence is ultimately established the
trial term will not permit a recovery over3 1
Third party practice under Section 193-a 72 of the Civil Practice Act was
further clarified, and active and passive negligence were more precisely
differentiated, in the recent decision of Putvin v. Buffalo Electric Co.73 In
this action plaintiffs were representatives of decedents who were employees
of the third-party defendant Wallace & Tiernan, Inc. The defendants, Joseph
Davis, Inc. and Davis Refrigeration Co., Inc., were performing work at and
around the plant of Wallace & Tiernan, Inc. when an explosion occurred which
gave rise to this suit.
The third-party defendant, in asking for a motion to dismiss the suit,
claimed that the third-party plaintiff was only charged with negligence in the
conduct and performance of its work and in the handling of materials in
connection with such work i.e., active negligence, and, therefore, could submit
proof only of this active negligence on trial. After reviewing the differences
between active and passive negligence and applying the language of the primary
complaint to their conclusions, the Court, in affirming the Appellate Division's
dismissal of the third-party complaint, held the complaint charged defendant
only with active negligence and thus the plaintiffs are limited to proving
defendant's affirmative acts of negligence. Since defendant could be only
found liable for active negligence, it could not implead the third-party defendant.
1 4
Active negligence may be either a fault of omission or one of commission.
Participation in an affirmative act of negligence clearly is active negligence.
However, in answering the question of when an act of omission constitutes
active negligence, a more elusive problem is posed. An act of omission may
comprise active negligence where there is some knowledge or acquiescence
in an affirmative negligent act, or where a defendant fails to perform some
duty which he may have undertaken.
In the instant case the Court claimed it was not as difficult to determine
if a defendant's negligence has been passive. "One cannot be guilty of passive
negligence merely if he has been guilty of a fault of commission. It is the
69. Massaro v. Long Island R.R. Co., 274 App. Div. 939, 83 N.Y.S.2d 527 (2d
Dep't 1948).
70. 2 CARmoDY-WAIT, N.Y. PRAcncE § 66, p. 614 (1952); Ruping v. Great Atlantic
& Pacific Tea Co., 283 App. Div. 204, 126 N.Y.S.2d 687 (3d Dep't 1953).
71. Johnson v. Endicott Johnson Corp., 278 App. Div. 626, 101 N.Y.S.2d 922
(3d Dep't 1951).
72. N.Y. Civ. PnAc. AcT § 193-a provides in part:
"After the service of his answer, a defendant may bring in a person not a
party to the action, who is or may be liable to him for all or part of
the plaintiff's claim against him.
73. 5 N.Y.2d 447, 186 N.Y.S.2d 15 (1959).
74. McFall v. Compagnie Maritime Beige, 304 N.Y. 314, 330, 107 N.E.2d 463, 472

(1952).
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omission or failure to perform a nondelegable type of duty (e.g., the duty
of an owner of realty or a shipowner to furnish the injured party with a safe
place to work), as distinguished from the failure to observe for the protection
of the interests of another person that degree of care and vigilance which
the circumstances justly demand, which constitute passive negligence entitling
one to indemnity."
Looking at the allegations found in the complaints in the present case, the
Court found that the allegation of negligence in the performance of defendant's
work and in the handling of materials was a fault of commission and, therefore,
active negligence. The second allegation in dispute presented a more delicate
problem for the Court. It charged the defendants with "failure . . . to supply
the plaintiff's intestate with a safe place to work"--seemingly an allegation of
passive negligence. The Court, looking at this allegation in the context of the
complaint, found this not to be passive negligence since in legal contemplation
the plaintiff and defendant were strangers. Under such circumstances defendant
was under no duty to supply plaintiffs with a safe place to work. The Court
said that this was an allegation of active negligence for it was an allegation which
meant that Davis & Co., the contractor, did owe decedents a duty not to make
their place of work unsafe by the manner in which it performed its work
on the premises of Wallace & Tiernan, Inc., the decedents' employer.
Judge Van Voorhis dissented on the ground that it was premature to
dismiss the third-party complaint before it was known upon what basis
recovery, if any, may be awarded at the trial to the original plaintiff against
the third-party plaintiff.
The present case, though not adding anything novel in regard to thirdparty practice, is a lucid and carefully prepared exposition on the intricacies
of third-party pleading. It appears, however, that a right of indemnity might
be denied to a defendant due to formalistic technicalities found in the original
complaint in an action. Therefore, instead of a rule of realism, we have a rule
of formalism. Be that as it may, it is still a rule that allows flexibility to meet
the exigencies of whatever situation the courts face.
SHERIFF'S RIGHT TO POUNDAGE FEES UNDER CIVIL PRACTICE

ACT

SECTION

687-A
In Personeni v. Aquino,75 the plaintiff, after a duly levied execution by
the sheriff on a debt owed to the judgment debtor, failed to take action to collect
the debt, or to obtain an order under Section 687-a, subdivision 7, of the New
York Civil Practice Act to extend time in which to do so, and hence the levy
became void. In rejecting the sheriff's claim for poundage fees under Section
1558, subdivision 19,76 of the Civil Practice Act, the majority decision of the
75. 6 N.Y.2d 35, 187 N.Y.S.2d 764 (1959).
76. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. AcT §. 1558:
"A sheriff is entitled for the services specified in this section to the
following fees" . . . (subdivision 19, now 21) ". . . Where an execution
has been vacated or set aside, the sheriff is entitled to poundage. ...
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